On May 6, 2024, the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs tabled Bill C-70: An Act respecting countering foreign interference (Bill C-70). The House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security held hearings and received written submissions on this Bill shortly thereafter.

HRAG submitted a written analysis of Bill C-70, with a focus on Parts 1, 2, and 4 of the Bill. Our analysis included identification of amendments that were particularly strong, and gaps for further action.

In Part 1, important amendments to the CSIS Act include the ability to disclose information to non-governmental entities when it is essential to the public interest and that interest clearly outweighs any of the privacy concerns that could result from disclosure. Further, disclosure to any person or entity in the interest of building resiliency against threats to the security of Canada also becomes a possibility under the proposed amendments, if certain requirements are met, including that no personal information is to be disclosed. The remaining amendments to the CSIS Act appear aimed at adjusting the legislation with regard to “datasets” with which the Service engages, and expanding the Service’s ability to carry out its functions, including outside Canada. A new section 29 mandates a parliamentary review of the CSIS Act every five years. It remains a limitation that Bill C-70 does not propose the addition of a definition of “transnational repression” to the CSIS Act or to any of the other pieces of legislation it amends or enacts.

In Part 2, amendments and additions to section 20 of the Security of Information Act (SOIA) are significant. Under the new section 20 (1), every person who “at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with, a foreign entity or a terrorist group, induces or attempts to induce, by intimidation, threat or violence, any person to do anything or to cause anything to be done” could be found to have committed an offence. Section 20 (2) broadens the extraterritorial application of this offence, and sections 20.1 (1), 20.2 (1), 20.3 (1), and 20.4 (1) create additional offences. Critically, section 20.4 (1) could help protect vulnerable political processes such as nomination contests from foreign interference. Finally, amendments to section 22 of SOIA widen the Act’s preparatory offences and raise the maximum penalty for their commission. The amendments to the Criminal Code are focused on the offence of sabotage. Amendments to section 52 (1) are included, and two new offences prohibit sabotage in relation to essential infrastructure and devices. Bill C-70 did not propose the addition of a specific foreign interference offence to the Criminal Code, nor that refugee espionage or online harassment or digital violence be criminalized.

In Part 3, Bill C-70 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security. Finally, Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, an encouraging development which mirrors similar legislation in other countries, although it remains limited to interference activities in relation to political or governmental processes, excludes certain classes of individuals from its application, and much of the detail is yet to be fleshed out in regulations.

Our submission was relied upon by different members of diaspora communities who testified at the hearings held by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, including the Executive Director of Canada Tibet Committee, Sherap Therchin. His remarks are online.