The Canadian Coalition for a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry (FITR Coalition) and Human Rights Action Group (HRAG) submitted comments today to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness pursuant to the public consultation on the proposed Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Regulations, to be enacted under the statutory authority of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act.

Our comments were as follows:

1. Certain key definitions are too narrow and create exploitable gaps. The current definition of “influence activities” requiring registration is limited to communications with public office holders; dissemination of information, such as radio, print publication or social media; and provision of benefit, such as money, or other items of value or services. This definition captures inducements but excludes coercion. Foreign state actors routinely engage in threatening and harassing behaviours, exerting pressure through community leaders, and using intimidation tactics that fall outside these categories. To be maximally effective, “influence activities” must capture not just carrots (provision of benefit) but also sticks (coercive conduct). Additionally, the definition should explicitly include activities undertaken indirectly through proxies and proxy organizations, indirect provision of benefits and benefits provided in-kind, and implied threats including those directed at family members, as these are tactics commonly employed by authoritarian regimes to obscure state involvement. Finally, the definition of “public office holder” should also be broadened to explicitly include school board trustees who are increasingly targeted by foreign influence operations but whose inclusion under current definitions is unclear. The Regulations should also explicitly recognize immediate family members of public office holders as potential vectors for foreign influence and coercion, particularly where threats, inducements, or benefits may be directed at them in order to influence the conduct of the office holder.
2. Transparency and accountability must work in tandem. The FITR Coalition and HRAG strongly support the implementation of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (“Act”) as a critical transparency mechanism. However, we note that the Regulations’ framing appears to equate transparency with legitimacy. The background text states that foreign entities’ activities are “considered legitimate” when “conducted openly and transparently”, and that the Act aims to distinguish “between legitimate and transparent foreign influence and covert and non-transparent foreign influence”. While transparency is essential for accountability, it does not render all registered activities legitimate or lawful. For example, if a foreign state engages in surveilling or threatening individuals but registers this activity, the transparent nature of such acts would not make them legitimate. Transparent intimidation, surveillance, and coercion remain harmful and may violate Canadian law. The registry’s value lies in enabling detection and accountability, not in conferring legitimacy on registered activities. We recommend that the Regulations be revised to clarify that registration does not constitute government approval or endorsement of registered activities, and that compliance with registration requirements does not shield actors from investigation or prosecution under the Criminal Code, immigration law, or national security frameworks as applicable. More broadly, while this Act is welcomed and necessary, the FITR Coalition and HRAG emphasize that transparency measures –especially those limited in coverage to foreign influence in political or governmental processes– are insufficient to protect Canadians and Canadian institutions from foreign influence and transnational repression. We recommend the Canadian government develop complementary legislation geared toward improving accountability mechanisms, which could include consequential amendments to the Criminal Code to specifically prohibit acts of transnational repression by foreign state actors, and to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to make engagement in foreign interference or transnational repression explicit grounds for inadmissibility and removal. We further recommend that the Canadian government strengthen enforcement of existing Criminal Code provisions when perpetrated as part of foreign state operations, and ensure the RCMP, CBSA, and other relevant agencies have the capacity and mandate to investigate acts of foreign influence and transnational repression and engage in prosecutions as appropriate.
3. Penalties for non-registration should be higher and include alternative enforcement mechanisms. The penalty structure ranging from $50 to $1,000,000 may be insufficient to deter non-compliance, particularly by well-resourced foreign state actors. Even at the highest end, a $1,000,000 penalty represents a relatively modest sum for many foreign state budgets and carries the risk that autocratic regimes will simply absorb this as a cost of doing business rather than comply with registration requirements. We recommend the Government consider whether higher maximum penalties, or alternative enforcement mechanisms such as asset seizures, targeted sanctions, or enhanced consequences under complementary legislation, would more effectively deter covert foreign influence activities. However, penalties for non-registration alone address only one dimension of the problem. As noted above, the ultimate policy objective should be to discourage harmful foreign influence activities altogether, not merely to ensure they are registered. The goal should be to make both covert operations and overt harmful activities untenable, which requires a dual approach: sufficiently robust penalties to ensure compliance with transparency obligations, and meaningful legal consequences for activities that should be considered unacceptable even if overt (g., transnational repression).
4. Investigation criteria and complainant protection require clarification. The FITR Coalition and HRAG welcome the Commissioner’s investigative powers under the Act, including the authority to compel witness attendance and document production. However, several aspects of the investigation framework require clarification to ensure effectiveness. The briefing states that non-compliance will be “detected through multiple channels, including…proactive disclosures from the public” and that investigations “may use information from anonymous sources”. Meanwhile, critical operational details remain unclear: who may submit information and through what channels; whether reporting will be available in multiple languages; how anonymity and confidentiality will be protected for complainants facing potential retaliation; what evidentiary threshold triggers an investigation; and under what conditions complaints may be dismissed. Without these clarifications, victims of foreign influence activities and members of affected communities with relevant information may be unwilling to come forward, undermining a key detection mechanism. We recommend the Commissioner establish and publicly communicate robust, accessible, and secure reporting mechanisms with explicit protections for complainants, and publish transparent operational policies establishing criteria for initiating investigations and prioritizing enforcement resources. More broadly, the effectiveness of the Registry will depend on public understanding. We recommend the Commissioner issue clear, accessible guidance, particularly for diaspora communities, civil society organizations, and local institutions, on recognizing, documenting, and reporting foreign influence activities.
5. Accelerated reporting requirements needed during elections and critical political events. Section 3 of the Regulations requires updates to registered information within 15 days after the end of the month in which changes occur. While this timeframe may be acceptable under normal circumstances, it is problematic during elections, leadership races, and other critical political moments when foreign influence activities are most likely to intensify and when transparency is most urgent. A 15-day post-month-end reporting window means that influence activities occurring early in an election month may not be disclosed until nearly 45 days later – well after votes are cast. Other jurisdictions, including Australia, impose accelerated reporting requirements during election periods to ensure timely transparency when it matters most. We recommend the Regulations establish shortened reporting timelines for updates occurring during federal, provincial, or municipal election periods, party leadership contests and nomination campaigns, and other defined critical political events to ensure the registry serves its transparency function when foreign influence poses the greatest risk to democratic processes.
6. Public registry should include targeted public office holders and compensation details. Section 4 of the Regulations details what information provided to the Commissioner will be made publicly available in the registry. While the list is fairly comprehensive, two significant omissions undermine public transparency and accountability. First, the names of public office holders who are targets of foreign influence activities will be provided to the Commissioner by registrants but will not be included in the public registry (Section 4(e)(iii)). Public disclosure of which officials are being targeted is essential for public scrutiny, media oversight, and accountability, particularly when foreign states may be attempting to influence specific decision-makers on matters of national interest. Second, compensation details will not be made public, despite affected communities identifying this information as critical to understanding the scale and seriousness of foreign influence arrangements. Public Safety has characterized this as “personal financial details” raising privacy concerns. However, payments received from foreign states for influence activities are fundamentally foreign state expenditures, not private financial matters. Even if such compensation were considered personal information, the national security interest in transparency regarding foreign influence activities should supersede privacy concerns. Without disclosure of compensation, the public cannot assess whether influence activities involve token payments or substantial financial inducements that may indicate heightened foreign interest in shaping Canadian policy. We recommend that both the names of targeted public office holders and compensation details be included in the public registry to ensure meaningful transparency and enable effective public oversight of foreign influence activities.
7. Safety-based disclosure exemptions must protect victims of transnational repression. The Regulations allow certain information to be withheld from the public registry if there are reasonable grounds to believe disclosure would pose a threat to personal safety. While safety protections are important, critical questions remain unanswered: whose personal safety is being protected (the registrant, the targeted public office holder, complainants, or others); what criteria the Commissioner will use to assess safety threats; and how competing safety interests will be balanced when disclosure protects some individuals while potentially endangering others. Most critically, the framework must explicitly account for transnational repression. In cases where foreign state actors engage in intimidation, surveillance, or coercion, non-disclosure of the arrangement, even on safety grounds, may perpetuate the very harm the registry aims to expose, leaving targeted communities unaware of coordinated foreign influence campaigns against them. We recommend the Regulations or Commissioner guidance establish clear criteria for safety-based exemptions that explicitly recognize transnational repression as a factor and require careful balancing that considers whether non-disclosure would enable ongoing harm to vulnerable populations.
8. The regulations should be reviewed after one year. The consultation period for review of the proposed Regulations was 30 days. To better enable members of affected communities to provide comments, the Regulations should be subject to an additional review and consultation period after one year of implementation. This will also enable members of affected communities to provide feedback on the Regulations as they have been implemented in practice. The Regulations should then be subjected to additional reviews and consultation periods every five years thereafter.

The FITR Coalition and HRAG will continue to engage with policymakers and the public to ensure that defending against foreign interference and transnational repression remains a priority.